# A Brief Primer on Probability

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## The Probability Axioms

Consider a language  $\mathcal{L}$  of propositions, closed under truth-functional connectives. Define a real-valued function c over  $\mathcal{L}$  to represent the *credence* (or *degree of belief*) that an agent assigns to the propositions in  $\mathcal{L}$ . According to **Probabilism**, rationality requires c to be a probability function—and, thus, to obey the following axioms:

#### The Probability Axioms

Non-Negativity. Every  $X \in \mathcal{L}$  is assigned a non-negative number.

$$c(X) \ge 0 \tag{1}$$

Normality. Every tautology  $\top \in \mathcal{L}$  is assigned 1.

$$c(\top) = 1 \tag{2}$$

Finite Additivity. For any mutually exclusive  $X,Y \in \mathcal{L}$ , the number assigned to their disjunction equals the sum of the numbers assigned to them.

If 
$$(X \wedge Y) \vDash \bot$$
, then  $c(X \vee Y) = c(X) + c(Y)$  (3)

Here are three interesting and useful facts.

*The Negation Rule:* For any  $X \in \mathcal{L}$ ,  $c(\neg X) = 1 - c(X)$ .

The Overlap Rule: The probability of a disjunction equals the sum of the probabilities of its disjuncts minus the probability of its disjuncts' overlap.

$$c(X \lor Y) = c(X) + c(Y) - c(X \land Y)$$

*The Logical Consequence Rule:*\* If  $X \models Y$ , then  $c(X) \le c(Y)$ .

### Conditional Probability

In addition to the three axioms above, we introduce the notion of *conditional probability*.

The Ratio Formula: For any  $X, Y \in \mathcal{L}$  with c(Y) > 0,

$$c(X \mid Y) = \frac{c(X \land Y)}{c(Y)} \tag{4}$$

$\neg p$	 It's not the
	case that $p$ .
$p \wedge q$	 p and $q$ .
$p \vee q$	 p or q.
$p \supset q$	 If $p$ , then $q$ .
$p \equiv q$	 p if and only
	if $q$ .

For any  $X \in \mathcal{L}$ ,  $c(X) \in \mathbb{R}$ .

Interesting Fact: These are known as the Kolmogorov Axioms, named after Andrey Kolmogorov, the Soviet mathematician who introduced them in 1933.

A tautology (which we'll abbreviate as  $'\top'$ ) is any proposition that is guaranteed to be true as a matter of logic: e.g.,  $(p \lor \neg p)$ .

Two propositions are *mutually exclusive* if it's impossible that they *both* be true. Each one refutes the other. And so, their conjunction entails a contradiction (which we'll abbreviate as ' $\perp$ ').

[\*] The Conjunction Fallacy. In a famous study, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) presented subjects with the following story:

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

The subjects were then asked to rank the probabilities of the following propositions:

- Linda is active in the feminist movement.
- o Linda is a bank teller.
- Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

A large majority of the subjects ranked the third option as more probable than the second!

This is the probability that *X* is the case *conditional* on *Y* being the case. Given the notion of conditional credence, here are two more useful facts.

*The Law of Total Probability:* For any  $X, Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_n \in \mathcal{L}$ , where  $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_n$  form a partition (i.e., are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive),

$$c(X) = c(X \mid Y_1) \cdot c(Y_1) + c(X \mid Y_2) \cdot c(Y_2) + \dots \cdot c(X \mid Y_n) \cdot c(Y_n)$$

The Multiplication Rule: For any  $X, Y \in \mathcal{L}$ , if c(Y) > 0, then

$$c(X \land Y) = c(X \mid Y) \cdot c(Y)$$

And here's a useful definition:

*Independence:*\* *X* and *Y* are probabilistically independent just in case  $c(X \mid Y) = c(X)$ .

## **Updating by Conditionalization**

How should your degrees of belief evolve over time? Let  $c_t$  be your credences at time t, and  $c_{t+}$  be your credences at some later time  $t^+$ .

Conditionalization. If  $E \in \mathcal{L}$  is everything you learn between t and  $t^+$ , then, for any  $X \in \mathcal{L}$ ,  $c_{t^+}(X) = c_t(X \mid E)$ .

The conditional function  $c(\bullet \mid X)$  satisfies the Kolmogorov Axioms, and thus is itself a probability function. So, updating by Conditionalization won't lead you to violate Probabilism.

#### Bayes' Theorem

Calculating  $c(X \mid E)$  can be made significantly easier by making use the following famous theorem.

Bayes' Theorem. For any  $X, E \in \mathcal{L}$ , where c(E) > 0,

$$c(X \mid E) = \frac{c(E \mid X) \cdot c(X)}{c(E)} \tag{5}$$

Given The Law of Total Probability, the theorem can be rewritten as follows:

$$c(X \mid E) = \frac{c(E \mid X) \cdot c(X)}{c(E \mid X) \cdot c(X) + c(E \mid \neg X) \cdot c(\neg X)}$$

And, where  $X, Y_1, Y_2, ..., Y_n \in \mathcal{L}$  form a partition,

$$c(X \mid E) = \frac{c(E \mid X) \cdot c(X)}{c(E \mid X) \cdot c(X) + c(E \mid Y_1) \cdot c(Y_1) + \dots + c(E \mid Y_n) \cdot c(Y_n)}$$

 $c(X \mid Y)$ , your credence in X given Y, is not your current actual opinion about X—rather, it's your assessment of X on the supposition that *Y* is true.

When  $c(X \mid Y) > c(X)$ , we say that Y is positively relevant to X—X and Y are taken to be positively correlated.